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The Case for Incomprehension 
Édouard Glissant’s Poetics of Relation and the Right to 
Opacity 
Neal Allar 
Cornell University 
...nous voyons les corbeaux et nous disons : ils parlent une 
langue étrangère... mais non, les corbeaux ne parlent pas une 
langue étrangère, les corbeaux parlent leur propre langue et 
nous ne la comprenons pas... 
– Simone Schwartz-Bart 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
in 1946, resolves that education should, first of all, develop intercultural 
understanding: “Education […] shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups.”1 Understanding, it 
is supposed, fosters respect for human dignity, connects people across lines 
of difference, and counters the dehumanizing impulse of genocide and 
colonialism. A generation later, though, the Martinican poet and 
philosopher Édouard Glissant would assert a very different human right, 
namely, the right not to be understood: “Nous réclamons le droit à 
l’opacité.”2 Opacité has since become a recognizable term in the 
multidisciplinary realm of postcolonial theory, as literary critics, 
anthropologists, historians and sociologists investigate how subjects and 
cultures maintain their specificity against the universalizing tendencies of 
globalization and neocolonialism.3 A person exercises the right to opacity by 
refusing to conform to rationalist modes of understanding; he or she resists 
any epistemology that would “construct the Other as an object of 
knowledge.”4 In what follows, I argue that Glissant conceived of opacity first 
and foremost in his poetry and in his readings of earlier writers, from 
Mallarmé to Saint-John Perse to William Faulkner, whose moments of 
complication or incomprehensibility he found productive. By examining the 
literary valence of this concept of Caribbean philosophy, I claim that opacity 
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not only protects the subject from the invasive grasp of (neo)colonial 
thought but also, more affirmatively, invites the reader to join the poet on 
equal footing in the process of sense-making. It is this kind of collective 
poetics, a collectivity created in opacity, that Glissant imagines in his 
broader world vision of Relation and the Tout-Monde. 
 Glissant’s vast corpus of poems, novels, theatre and critical essays 
begins in the late 1940s and ends just before his death in 2011. The notion of 
opacity gets developed throughout the entirety of this long career, including 
in the earliest poetry collections Le sang rivé and Un champ d’îles, but 
Caribbean and postcolonial studies tend to focus on Glissant’s assertion of 
the droit à l’opacité at the beginning of the seminal critical work Le discours 
antillais (1981). It is here that the term’s political, militant valence appears 
most fully. Opacity becomes a mode of survival for “les peuples néantisés 
qui opposent aujourd’hui à l’universel de la transparence, imposé par 
l’Occident.”5 This call for epistemological resistance has fit well into a 
postcolonial discourse that emphasizes the subaltern’s power to “write 
back,” as Helen Tiffin puts it, not only to a Western audience but also “to the 
whole of the discursive field” that mediates and hierarchizes the reading of 
texts.6 The right to opacity could be seen as a kind of radical “writing back” 
that challenges, at the most basic level, the idea of reading comprehension. 
Additionally, Michael Dash notes that this resistance can take form in the 
radical cultural impenetrability of the Maroons – the descendants of escaped 
slaves still living in isolated communities in Caribbean islands’ mountainous 
interior7 – or as a “more anonymous and pedestrian form of resistance” in 
everyday language.8 Celia Britton provides a compelling account of the 
political stakes of this militancy: 
Relation and opacity work together to resist the reductiveness of 
humanism [...] In this sense opacity becomes a militant position [...] 
opacity is also a defense against understanding, at least in the 
hierarchical, objectifying way in which this usually operates 
between the West and the Third World [...] The right to opacity [...] 
is a right not to be understood.9 
Glissant’s etymological critique of “comprehension” as a possessive seizure 
(com-prehendere) confirms Britton’s sense that opacity applies to both the 
subject and his or her speech. More recently, in the 2013 issue of Callaloo 
dedicated to Glissant soon after his death, H. Adlai Murdoch describes how 
this mode of resistance fits, ontologically and epistemologically, into the 
philosophy of the Tout-Monde that Glissant develops in his later work: 
“Opacité, then, serves to posit an unknowable otherness that, in its turn, 
mediates a new groundwork for being-in-the-world. At bottom, it is an 
epistemologically-grounded world vision that allows each subject the right 
to her or his own unknowability.”10 For Murdoch, moreover, opacity is a 
cultural phenomenon as much as an individual one: “Such an interpretation 
of opacity inscribes an implicit recognition that each subject maintains 
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cultural patterns and artifacts that will remain incomprehensible to other 
subjects who are not inscribed in, or have not been formed by, the same 
culture.”11 The upshot of Murdoch’s argument is, quite crucially, that the 
category of opacity must necessarily arise from a situation of colonial 
domination, in which one group requires this form of epistemological 
resistance in order to preserve its subjective agency, in order to survive as a 
culture. In the postcolonial global age, the right to opacity would mediate 
the relationship between the local and the global by guaranteeing cultural 
specificity against the homogenizing forces of neoliberal economics and 
dominant cultural trends. 
 However, these accounts’ inattention to the poetic, that is, creative or 
productive power of opacity reflects the simplification that the term has 
undergone in discussions of Glissant’s oeuvre. Few scholars remember how 
Glissant develops opacity in the work of the 1950s and 1960s, including the 
poems in Un champ d’îles and Le sang rivé and the essays in Soleil de la 
conscience and L’intention poétique. Opacity, especially at that time, was tied 
deeply to Glissant’s experience of reading and writing literature. The 
eventual militancy of the claim to the right to opacity grew out of Glissant’s 
experience of language as the medium through which all political activity 
must occur. To read the right to opacity as a poetic claim as much as a 
political one is not to reduce its political purchase, nor to exaggerate poetry’s 
importance to specific political action. Rather, it is to recognize the 
fundamental importance of poetry to the vision of human interaction that 
Glissant calls Relation, whose activity he calls, quite deliberately, the 
“poetics” of Relation. It is to reintroduce complexity into a term that, despite 
its critique of reductive understandings, has itself been reduced to a simple 
understanding. Opacity, in its fullest sense, provides not simply a protective 
shield for the postcolonial subject but rather an affirmative modality for 
reading, writing and interacting in the postcolonial world. In the same way, 
Glissant’s poetry, some of the most opaque work written in French in the 
twentieth century, does not seek to preserve local cultural artifacts from the 
influence of outside forces; on the contrary, it entrusts itself to the world, 
embracing, as Glissant repeatedly affirms, the unforeseeable (imprévisible) 
possibilities of the enunciation. 
 
 
Opacity is Relation’s epistemology and poetic modality. It conditions the 
apprehension of knowledge and the experience of self-expression in a 
system of thought opposed to the colonial order. Glissant spends his entire 
career conceptualizing Relation, and opacity remains closely tied to Relation 
throughout its development. Glissant’s thought, then, rests on a chief 
paradox: a notion of intercultural and inter-subjective relationality that 
depends, strangely, on incomprehension. His championing of opacity in his 
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later essays (after 1980), I will argue, occurs as a tacit rereading of the poetic 
works and the literary criticism he published earlier in his career. As he 
shifts between and mixes philosophical frameworks and methodologies 
throughout his essays, Glissant continually renews his reflection on the 
potential for poetic language to create Relation precisely by remaining 
dense, difficult or opaque. I will thus highlight how opacity’s development 
as a poetic concept was implicated in the development of Glissant’s 
philosophical thought, particularly the different ontological and 
epistemological concepts that inform his articulation of Relation across his 
career. 
The shifts in Glissant’s thought have been much debated in recent years. 
Peter Hallward’s polemical Absolutely Postcolonial challenges the widely held 
notion that Glissant’s oeuvre is a long elaboration of a set of key concepts 
and that “his major preoccupations are apparent from the earliest writing.”12 
Hallward argues instead that the “late Glissant” (after the publication of Le 
discours antillais in 1981) shifts radically away from specific political concerns 
of national liberation towards an over-aestheticized, apolitical poetics. In 
Hallward’s critique, this shift is symptomatic of postcolonial studies in 
general, which, under the influence of such theorists as Homi Bhabha and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and the postmodern philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, has moved away from an examination of 
“specific” anti-colonial action, toward celebrations of abstract, generalized 
“singularity.” Nick Nesbitt and Chris Bongie, though more generous 
towards Glissant, also identify an “aesthetic turn” in the later work.13 Celia 
Britton and Charles Forsdick, on the other hand, have argued that this shift 
does not signify a turn away from politics but rather a different way of 
approaching the set of political questions with which Glissant has always 
been concerned.14 My interest in this debate lies in how it has largely located 
Glissant’s “shift” in his adoption of Deleuze in Poétique de la Relation and, 
moreover, the assertion (by Nesbitt and Hallward in particular) of Glissant’s 
latent Hegelianism earlier in his career. Although I ultimately argue that 
Glissant’s poems and poetic prose disrupt this periodization – it is quite 
Deleuzian before Deleuze even wrote his first book – Glissant’s mixing and 
moving between the seemingly disparate philosophical frameworks of 
Hegel and Deleuze fundamentally inform his conceptualization of opacity 
throughout his essays. 
 It is strange to speak of a Hegelian Glissant, for, as Glissant himself 
points out, Hegel’s racism and Eurocentrism is stark.15 Nonetheless, Nick 
Nesbitt’s work in Voicing Memory successfully demonstrates the degree to 
which Glissant’s notion of Relation is in fact a “dialectical relation” – a 
system built upon the interaction of opposing terms. Alexandre Kojève’s 
revival of Hegel in the 1930s and 1940s, indeed, had a great influence on 
Glissant’s predecessors in the Negritude movement, as did the dialectical 
thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. As Nesbitt argues, Hegel provided the anti-
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colonial Negritude movement with both a language of resistance, which 
Sartre famously summed up in his phrase “anti-racist racism,” and a hope 
that by negating the colonized self in their writing, the Negritude poets 
could enter into history as liberated subjects.16 Arriving at the tail-end of this 
movement, Glissant sought to imagine dialectical resistance as an 
affirmative mode of expression. From the beginning of L’intention poétique 
(1969), opacity becomes an integral condition for the concept of relation,17 
and the influence of Hegelian dialectics looms large. The negation of 
comprehension by opacity, the tension between the self’s desire to 
understand and the other’s densité or impenetrability, gives way to a higher 
mode of self-expression: “la poétique de la relation suppose qu’à chacun soit 
proposée la densité (l’opacité) de l’autre. Plus l’autre résiste dans son 
épaisseur ou sa fluidité (sans s’y limiter), plus sa réalité devient expressive, 
et plus la relation féconde.”18 Relation here occurs as a dialectical synthesis 
between the drive to understand and the opacity that resists this 
understanding; the greater the tension that this resistance creates, the richer 
the experience of relation that follows. 
 Even a cursory glance at Glissant’s early musings shows that this 
dialectic movement pervades Glissant’s world. Soleil de la conscience (1956) is 
the first volume in the essay series called “Poétiques” that spans Glissant’s 
career and renders his philosophical notions into a distinctly poetic 
language. In its more imagistic moments, Soleil, like Glissant’s early poetry, 
is full of contrasts between light and dark, ethereal and dense, fluid and 
solid, opaque and transparent. Speaking of his preference for working in the 
hours before dawn, the young Glissant reveals his taste for such opposites: 
J’ai peur de hâter cette nuit. D’épuiser déjà cette nuit où l’obscurité monte 
comme un amour défunt. Je m’obstine à cette ultime clarté d’avant le 
matin : elle est sauvage et drue, quelque splendeur qui de soi-même 
s’affame.19 
The “ultimate clarity” occurs in the dark, in the petit matin, recalling Aimé 
Césaire’s famous refrain in Cahier d’un retour au pays natal. This clarity is, 
oddly, “drue” – one of Glissant’s favorite adjectives at this stage in his career, 
uniting the sense of vigor and proliferation with a feeling of impenetrable 
density, like a thick plant. The word is prominent in the poetry collection Un 
champ d’îles, published four years earlier, where it is also associated with the 
contrast between night and day, clarity and obscurity: 
Mais lui ne touche plus que les bâtisses de ce bruit autour des rues 
où l’herbe pousse. Elle pousse ! drue et sanglante dans son cœur 
(est-ce la rue, ou bien son cœur ?) – drue et blessée, l’herbe a gravi la 
nuit ! Maintenant sur la prairie les beaux pluviers réapparus font 
des réverbères, non, des étoiles. Qu’est-ce l’étoile sinon la chose très 
obscure […] ?20 
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On the one hand, drue, which refers most literally to a plant whose multiple 
stems result in a dense mass, foreshadows Glissant’s later adoption of 
Deleuze’s ontology of proliferating multiplicity, the rhizome. On the other 
hand, drue is inscribed into these passages’ play of productive 
contradictions: clarity can only come about via an engagement with 
obscurity (“Qu’est-ce l’étoile sinon la chose très obscure”), and darkness 
provides the ground for the “splendeur” of Glissantian poetics. 
Just as the adjective dru both expresses the dialectical movement of 
Glissant’s early writing and hints at his future adoption of Deleuzian 
nomadology, so does the explicit mention of dialectics in Soleil de la 
conscience coincide with a language of chaos that presages Glissant’s much 
later category of the chaos-monde. Indeed, it is only in retrospect that these 
two systems might seem separate, for in Glissant’s paragraphs the 
“synthesis” of cultures in the Antilles occurs in a state of productive chaos. 
Of the Antilles, Glissant affirms, “voici une synthèse de races, de mœurs, de 
savoirs, mais qui tend vers son unité propre.”21 This “unity,” though, is 
always in question due to the disorganizing forces of Antillean multiplicity, 
as he asserts only a page later. Here, Glissant’s challenge to the postcolonial 
world is to embrace this synthetic chaos as a poetics that inevitably 
reverberates into politics: “il est un temps d’ouverture chaotique, de 
pressentiment anarchique de l’histoire, de mâchage furieux des mots, de 
saisi vertigineuse des clartés.”22 Indeed, throughout his oeuvre, Glissant 
attempts to bring the powerful push-pull movement of binary opposites 
(opacity and transparency not the least of them) into a system that also 
recognizes complex, nonlinear, nonhierarchical proliferation as an 
affirmative challenge to old colonial hierarchies and rationalist 
epistemologies. The later works on Relation and Tout-Monde attempt more 
formally to theorize this progression toward the Whole, the Tout, that 
nonetheless cannot be expressed as a comprehensive singularity but rather 
as an incomprehensible mass of proliferating offshoots. 
The early poetry enacts this paradoxical system by demonstrating a 
fascination with dialectical opposites while also, with its ambiguous 
pronouns and paratactic combinations of diverse images, lending itself to an 
“ouverture chaotique.” Indeed, the great number of dialectical opposites do 
not resolve into neat syntheses but rather propel the expression into a space 
of deliberate disorder, for the collision of such elements as light and dark or 
fluid and solid calls into question the very epistemology that separated them 
in the first place. In the following passage from Un champ d’îles, for example, 
the “moi” encapsulates qualities of impenetrability and density and, at the 
same time, radical transparency and permeability – a celebration of the 
oxymoron’s ability to disrupt the compartmentalizing tendency of 
conventional language: 
Les fleuves passent à travers moi vers la transparence des terres me 
voilà […] 
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Dans ce foisonnement de soleils que distribuent l’arrosoir des 
arbres C’est moi la rivière la roche impassible et dans son sein 
l’ardeur de la terre 
    La foudre la main qui caresse l’éclair la main qui offre c’est nous 
[…]23 
The contrast between the flowing transparency of the river and the hard 
impassibility of the boulder is reflected in the tension between the 
unpunctuated, fluid syntax and the impenetrable collection of words which 
do not cohere into a comprehensive message. Similar meditations, both 
formal and conceptual, on the tension between these contrasting perceptions 
of the world crop up throughout Glissant’s early literature. This literature’s 
distinctive opacity, its resistance to easy comprehension or explication, 
reinforces the sense that the most productive and enlightening vision of the 
world arises from experiences of abysmal darkness. Similarly, the wisdom of 
the Caribbean, as he later says in “La barque ouverte,” is derived from the 
collective memory of the “expérience du gouffre” – the bowels of the slave 
ship, the graveyard of the Atlantic.24 
 Whereas the poetic writing, including parts of Soleil de la conscience as 
well as the first two collections of poetry, complicates this dialectic 
relationality with a proto-Deleuzian movement of chaotic proliferation, 
Glissant’s earlier literary criticism bears more exclusively the signs of 
Hegelian influence. Glissant’s first formal analysis of opacity comes in 
L’intention poétique. The chapter entitled “Sur l’opacité” is an examination of 
William Faulkner’s novels, especially Absalom, Absalom! Glissant asserts, in 
an overt dialectic, that Faulkner’s failure to enter into his black characters’ 
psyches is, in fact, one of the most positive elements of his examination of 
racial politics in the American South. The Black American, in this fiction, can 
only be known by his opacity, which renders his character all the more 
expressive: 
L’opacité du Nègre pour Faulkner est, bien entendu, son 
impénétrabilité : autant que la peau noire, l’âme obscure […] Le 
monologue intérieur ne sera jamais propre au personnage noir, et 
ce qu’on surprendra le plus souvent de celui-ci ce sera un 
grommellement […] Pourquoi donc ces personnages […] nous 
retiennent-ils ? Précisément pour leur négativité révélatrice : pour 
l’impossibilité où se trouve l’auteur, qui les a créés, d’aller au fond 
de leurs motivations. Ils opposent ainsi à Faulkner lui-même un non 
au-delà qu’il ne franchira jamais. Autrement dit : l’incapacité de 
Faulkner à cerner ce personnage est positive.25 
Faulkner brings his black characters to life precisely by laying bear his own 
inability to gain access to their inner life.26 It is not simply a question of 
respecting the other’s impenetrability or irreducibility. In this dialectical 
logic,27 incomprehensibility becomes a positive, a “négativité révélatrice,” in 
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which the character’s opacity signals an overcoming of the reader’s 
reductive grasp and, moreover, a new way of understanding that relies on a 
self-conscious critique of the literary and linguistic processes through which 
knowledge is apprehended. A different version of this logic appears in the 
prose poetry of Un champ d’îles, which contains the paradoxical refrain, 
“Absente qui êtes présence!”28 In the context of a Caribbean history defined 
by the decimation of native populations and the violent uprooting of African 
populations from their ancestral homes, presence cannot come about 
without a prior absence. Caribbean knowledge depends upon a 
confrontation with the obscurity at the heart of its narrative, and Glissant 
seems to suggest that Caribbean poetics must carry the mark of that 
obscurity – must acknowledge the contingency or incompleteness of all 
knowledge. He finds a similar gesture in Faulkner’s fiction, which casts a 
veil over a tragic secret at its core – in Absalom, Absalom!, this secret is the 
miscegenation in the Sutpen family – and the act of reading leads to an 
avowal of that secret without the complete comprehension of it. The entire 
narration of Absalom, Absalom! is indeed a series of unreliable rereadings by 
various characters. Layers of storytelling disrupt the access to the original 
historical facts of the Sutpen family tragedy. The novel thus critiques the 
possibility of storytelling itself as a form of unveiling, and the object of 
examination becomes, rather than the truth behind the fiction, the 
mechanism itself of this necessarily opaque fiction: 
Affirmer en même temps le secret original et exposer un 
mécanisme de son dévoilement, c’est aviver la conscience 
collective, l’entretenir dans l’angoisse et l’interrogation. Le roman 
dévoile un voilé qui ne devient jamais pur dévoilé mais s’expose dans 
la mécanique même du dévoilement.29 
The dizzying oscillations of what Glissant calls “cette suprême 
dialectique” reenacts the collective “vertige” that he claims Faulkner’s 
novels elicit in their readers, a vertigo rooted in the American historical 
memory, which relies on an idea of racial and ancestral purity but which is 
constantly confronted by the fact of métissage or miscegenation at its secret 
center. America was built on a foundation of racial mixing, but its dominant 
narrative constantly struggles to recuperate its pure “roots” in the Old 
World. Faulkner’s opaque writing avows this uncomfortable fact precisely 
by examining the veil that has been cast over the métissage at the origins of 
American history. The motivations of such characters as Charles Bon and Joe 
Christmas, both of whom “pass” as white until their blackness is discovered, 
provide the core mystery around which Faulkner’s complex and difficult 
sentences turn.30 
 After L’intention poétique, Glissant’s next work of critical prose is the 
seminal Discours antillais, in which he first asserts the “droit à l’opacité.” The 
Discours probably remains Glissant’s most canonical text,31 and it also speaks 
most clearly to the specific issues of the departmentalization of the French 
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West Indies. It mentions opacity in the first pages and, later, in its discussion 
of Martinican Creole, which began, Glissant claims, as a willful inscrutability 
vis-à-vis the white plantation families. It is in the Discours that opacity takes 
on its most militant valence – “l’élan des peoples néantisés qui opposent 
aujourd’hui à l’universel de la transparence, imposé par l’Occident”32 – but, 
crucially, Glissant also critiques Martinican Creole (as opposed to Haitian 
Creole) for its insularity, which he calls a “poétique contrainte,” because it 
fails to adapt itself to the needs of a free population and autonomous 
economy.33 The failures of Creole, Glissant asserts, are closely tied to 
Martinique’s economic failures: an island that no longer produces its own 
goods must import everything it needs; its own language therefore cannot 
be the language of the marketplace.34 It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
analyze the complex demands that Glissant makes of his island, but suffice it 
to say that an enclosed, protective form of opacity was never the solution. 
Even in Le discours antillais, opacity’s resistant function retains the dialectic 
impulse to project expression outward, to turn a form of resistance into a 
mode of sharing, to open itself via its initial closure. The debate in 
Martinique between Creole and French, he states, must end in the 
affirmation of an opacity that is constantly active, constantly renewing its 
process and diversifying itself: 
D’abord, du point de vue du débat entre ces deux langues, le créole 
et le français, dont l’une a jusqu’ici subi la transcendance de l’autre, 
on peut affirmer que la seule pratique possible est de les rendre 
opaques l’une à l’autre. Développer partout, contre un humanisme 
universalisant et réducteur, la théorie des opacités particulières. 
Dans le monde de la Relation, qui prend le relais du système 
unifiant de l’Être, consentir à l’opacité c’est-à-dire la densité 
irréductible de l’autre, c’est accomplir véritablement, à travers le 
divers, l’humain. L’humain n’est peut-être pas l’« image de 
l’homme » mais aujourd’hui la trame sans cesse recommencée de 
ces opacités consenties.35 
It would be simple enough to read this paragraph as positing a pure 
opposition, in which French and Creole form opposing terms – “opaque, 
l’une à l’autre” – imagining opacity as a mechanism for relation via mutual 
self-distinction. However, elements of the Glissant of Poétique de la Relation – 
the first text after the so-called “aesthetic turn” in Glissant’s career – are 
already present in the Discours’s account of opacity, in its insistence on a 
solidarity built in opacity. The language here refers tacitly to the notion of 
text: etymologically speaking, “la trame” – the weave – creates the text (from 
the Latin textus, “thing woven”). The notion of “opacité consenties,” in 
addition to calling for a mutual acceptance of incomprehension, carries the 
implication of a broader, collective sense-making (con-sentir). 
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 This may seem like etymological quibbling if it were not for the fact 
that Glissant increases this textual/textile lexicon in his later work. In his 
chapter in Poétique de la Relation entitled “Pour l’opacité,” Glissant uses the 
metaphor of the text as a “weave” to argue that opacity occurs not in 
isolation but rather in open solidarity. For him, coexistence is precisely what 
distinguishes “difference” from “opacity.” The textual metaphor is much 
more explicit here than in the Discours, and in the spirit of Glissantian 
poétique, it assumes the fundamental connection between the socio-political 
and the literary: 
Non pas seulement consentir au droit à la différence mais, plus 
avant, au droit à l’opacité, qui n’est pas l’enfermement dans une 
autarcie impénétrable, mais la subsistance dans une singularité non 
réductible. Des opacités peuvent coexister, confluer, tramant des 
tissus dont la véritable compréhension porteraient sur la texture de 
cette trame et non pas sur la nature des composants.36 
Glissant here conceives of opacity as a textual weave that must be created by 
collectivities. The refusal to penetrate to the “nature” of the text speaks quite 
directly to the material image of an opaque text, whose incomprehensibility 
disrupts the penetration to a “deeper meaning” and rather draws the 
attention to its corporeal surface, its “texture.” Opacity achieves this 
horizontal, collective signification as part of the quasi-Deleuzian system that 
Glissant imagines in Poétique de la Relation, which borrows from Deleuze 
such terms as the Baroque, the rhizome, and the chaos-monde (from Deleuze’s 
chaosmos, in turn borrowed from Joyce) to contest what he calls the 
rationalist idea of “Nature […] harmonieuse, homogène et connaissable en 
profondeur.”37 Glissant heralds the Baroque as a recognition of the world’s 
chaotic, ever-changing, unpredictable existence – in short, a challenge to the 
rationalistic mindset that laid the groundwork for colonialism and human 
objectification. Drawing on Deleuze’s analysis of art, architecture and 
philosophy in Le pli, Glissant asserts that Baroque art provided a challenge 
to the predominant, essentializing epistemology in Europe: 
L’art baroque fut une réaction contre la prétention rationaliste à 
pénétrer d’un mouvement uniforme et décisif les arcanes du connu. 
Le frisson baroque vise à signifier par là que toute connaissance est 
à venir, et que c’est ce qui en fait la valeur. Aussi bien les 
techniques du baroque vont-elles favoriser l’ « extension » au lieu 
de la « profondeur ».38 
If Relation is the dynamic world vision that comes of this Baroque 
aesthetic, then opacity is its form of expression. The opaque text, such as 
Glissant encountered in his readings of Mallarmé, Saint-John Perse and 
Faulkner, refuses a poetics of depth and forces a reading of the surface. The 
collective reading of the surface, in which meaning is not fixed or 
determined but rather unpredictable and constantly renewed with every 
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reading, stands in stark contrast to the Erasmian humanist ideal of a single 
scholar penetrating to the original, underlying truth of a text.39 The political 
stakes of such a reading are considerable; the embrace of unknowability not 
only resists the impulse to subsume subjects into racial or cultural essences 
but, more affirmatively, provides a modality for producing meaning in a 
way that recognizes the infinite possibility of the opaque text. A text that 
cannot be mastered can thus be understood in a multiplicity of ways. This is 
not to collapse signification into a nihilistic form of moral relativism; it is 
indeed a kind of relativism inasmuch as it places meaning in relation with 
other possibilities of meaning which could have been realized under other 
circumstances, but it is not the kind of relativism in which a subject 
appropriates meaning for his own use. As Deleuze explains in Le pli, a 
baroque relativism demonstrates to the reader or viewer that a variation in 
meaning had always been possible: “Ce n’est pas une variation de la vérité 
d’après le sujet, mais la condition sous laquelle apparaît au sujet la vérité 
d’une variation.”40 The surface reading, the reading of opacity in Relation, 
includes a consciousness of the collective, multiple activity in which each 
reading must take part. 
Glissant thus increasingly adopts the terms of Deleuze’s immanent 
ontology (even if the earlier texts developed similar ideas with less distinct 
terms), in which being is a single material plane extending to infinity, as 
opposed to the separation between material and transcendental, divine or 
ideal realms. Poétique de la Relation explains Relation as rhizomatic, 
borrowing the key term from Deleuze’s work with Félix Guattari in Mille 
plateaux. As opposed to the “arborescent” system of the root, in which 
knowledge returns to an idealized, unified and recognizable origin, the 
rhizome is a stem without a root, an inherently multiple growth 
proliferating in all directions: “un rhizome ne commence et n’aboutit pas, il 
est toujours au milieu, entre les choses, inter-être, intermezzo.”41 Yet whereas 
Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the rhizome as wholly different from a 
binary, Hegelian root system (“un rhizome comme tige souterraine se 
distingue absolument des racines et radicelles”),42 Glissant maintains the 
language of the root, conceiving of the rhizome as a multiplied root: “La 
racine est unique, c’est une souche qui prend tout sur elle et tue alentour ; 
[Deleuze et Guattari] lui opposent le rhizome qui est une racine démultipliée, 
étendue en réseau dans la terre ou dans l’air, sans qu’aucune souche y 
intervienne en prédateur irrémédiable.”43 Glissant’s misreading of Deleuze 
and Guattari here demonstrates his commitment to finding an alternative 
root system for the Caribbean subject, whom the slave trade and plantation 
system violently deracinated. Excluded from Western, capital-H Histoire, 
Glissant says, the Caribbean subject must accede to, via a poetic act, a 
multiplicity of “histoires”;44 Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, firmly 
oppose any kind of “histoire,” which implies a rooted sequence.45 
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Thus, despite his enthusiasm for Deleuze’s affirmative and proliferating 
ontology, Glissant maintains the Hegelian privilege of the entry into history: 
“Of course, Glissant criticizes the erasure of Antillean difference within the 
putative universalism of classical and late French colonialism, but he does so 
within the horizon of a greater totality: that of a self-conscious, globally 
engaged subject.”46 The making of “histoires” as opposed to “Histoire” 
constitutes the Caribbean form of this becoming-self-conscious. Similarly, if 
the late version of Relation follows the Deleuzian modality of the rhizome, it 
still depends upon the Hegelian language of the Other (which Deleuze 
carefully avoids): “La pensée du rhizome serait au principe de ce que 
j’appelle une poétique de la Relation, selon laquelle toute identité s’étend 
dans un rapport à l’Autre.”47 It would be hard to find a more economical 
coupling of Deleuze and Hegel, a mixing of ontologies of immanent 
extension and dialectic relation – a coupling unwilled by Deleuze.48 Nesbitt is 
thus right to propose that Glissant’s work is “divided, somewhat 
schizophrenically, […] between a Spinozian [and, implicitly, Deleuzian] 
discourse of unbroken immanence and one of dialectical enlightenment.”49 
Considering Deleuze’s and Guattari’s adoption of “schizo-analyse” as an 
alternative to the arborescent, Oedipal discourse of psychoanalysis, Nesbitt’s 
term tacitly suggests that Glissant is more Deleuzoguattarian than Deleuze 
and Guattari themselves, that is, more willing to bring together disparate 
concepts in a single system of thought. 
 Opacity accordingly bears the mark of this schizophrenic ontology. On 
the one hand, the material presence of incomprehensible language causes 
sense to ramify extensively and affirmatively rather than to be found 
through the penetration to a rooted referent. On the other hand, the opaque 
surface both negates access to a deeper meaning and provides a new form of 
visibility, namely, the text’s material presence. Hallward, in his sharp 
critique of Glissant, claims that this new visibility becomes yet another mode 
of counterproductive reduction, a new transparency: “Glissant’s famous 
defence of the ‘right to opacity,’ then, must be understood […] as a 
mechanism organized in the interest of its own eventual dissolution […] The 
specifically opaque will itself become the means to a more total becoming-
transparent which surpasses it and includes it.”50 Hallward’s rote rehearsal of 
the Hegelian dialectic, in which every term contains the seeds of its own self-
annihilation, is valid inasmuch as it refers to a greater form of 
understanding that opacity brings about. Glissant even appears to make 
such a claim, renewing transparence as a positive term in a few places in his 
work, in sharp contrast to the far more numerous moments when he decries 
transparency as an invasive, essentializing rationalism. In Poétique de la 
Relation, for example, he uses transparence to describe the free movement of 
Relation made possible by the work of opacity: 
Nous appelons donc opacité ce qui protège le Divers. Et désormais 
nous appelons transparence l’imaginaire de la Relation, qui en 
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pressentait depuis longtemps (depuis les Présocratiques ? Depuis 
les Mayas ? Dans Tombouctou déjà ? Depuis les poètes pré-
islamiques et les conteurs indiens ?) les tourbillons imprévisibles.51 
In this case, though, in which transparence takes on a surprisingly affirmative 
valence, we must be willing to hear transparence not as grasping, 
comprehending or peering through – transparency – but rather of “trans-
pearance,” the horizontal movement of presences and meanings in the 
system of Relation. Opacité produces transparence not by generating a new 
fixed and apprehensible object of meaning but rather by motivating the 
multiple emergence of meanings across a broad spectrum. Such a system of 
sense-making – a collective, multivalent, horizontal poetics – creates the 
conditions for the kind of interpersonal and intercultural activity that 
Glissant envisions in Relation. 
 
 
Glissant’s poetics in general and his notion of opacity in particular do not 
tend towards a conclusion, inasmuch as this word implies “closure.” I have 
argued that a text’s or a subject’s opacity does a great deal more than close off 
points of access; it opens an alternative space of meaning, in which the 
reader, interlocutor or audience must participate in meaning-making, all the 
while recognizing the necessary incompleteness of this creative act. Opacity, 
then, leaves us with a strong sense of inconclusiveness, an uncertainty that 
only increases as the experience of the text becomes more powerful. Glissant 
says as much in the introductory prose-poem of Le sang rivé – the very first 
page of his Poèmes complets. Both stylistically and conceptually, he prepares 
his reader for a dynamic but fragmented, scattered expression that requires 
collective reassembly, a reassembly that guarantees that the poem will not 
seek the static perfection of being but rather channel the dynamic energy of 
endless becoming, “sans cesse devient”: 
Non pas l’œuvre tendue, sourde, monotone autant que la mer qu’on 
sculpte sans fin – mais des éclats, accordés à l’effervescence de la terre – 
[…] – toujours demis, toujours repris, et hors d’achèvement – […] 
These unfinished bursts, he continues, lead to a kind of perfection through 
their own imperfection and to true knowledge via an embrace of the 
uncertain. The dialectical ear perks up at this play of opposites, but a proto-
Deleuzian sensibility also charges the volcanic power of Glissant’s scattered, 
comprehension-resistant mode of expression: 
Premiers cris, rumeurs naïves, formes laissées – témoins, incommodes 
pourtant, de ce projet – qui, de se rencontrer imparfaits se trouvent 
solitaires parfaitement – et peuvent ici convaincre de s’arrêter à l’incertain 
– cela qui tremble, vacille et sans cesse devient – comme une terre qu’on 
ravage – épars. 
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The ambiguous pronouns and accumulating relative clauses – a common 
feature in Glissant’s poetry – testify to his admiration for Faulkner and 
Mallarmé. However, whereas these two modernist writers both dramatize 
their own anxiety about the uncertainty inherent in their expression, 
Glissant affirms this uncertainty as the crucial quality of his poetics. This 
affirmation points to the productive quality of opacity, the ability for opacity 
to ramify senses and meanings out into a collective space. Thus, rather than 
expressing anxiety about an inaccessible “deeper” meaning concealed 
beneath the surface of the text, Glissant emphasizes the material text itself: 
“non des œuvres mais la matière elle-même dans quoi l’ouvrage chemine.” As the 
verb cheminer implies, Glissant’s text can have the feeling of an extended, 
winding exploration – an always unfinished survey of a vast geography. 
Glissant’s writing is itself, in a sense, as “uncertain” as the reader’s own 
experience of the opaque text. The writing is opaque to itself; it does not 
know where it is going, for it relies on its readers for propulsion. 
Conversely, as a reader assumes a role in the text’s creation, in its poetics, 
she must realize that she is turning but one thread in the vast weave of this 
totalité-monde of Glissant’s poem. Incomprehensible because too vast to sum 
up and too dynamic to capture, the opaque work is the textual model of a 
poetics of Relation: collectively wrought and utterly unmasterable.52 
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